INTRODUCTION
For long economists have known that the beliefs of agents in an economy affect the outcomes in the economy. Not only that, it has also been recognized that the beliefs that agents have about the actions and beliefs of other agents are also important in determining the evolution of the economy. Keynes, in a famous passage in the General Theory, likened professional investment to a beauty contest where predicting the average opinions of others is essential. Almost any comment about investor behavior on the financial markets stress the importance of investors predictions of thè`m arket'' in particular, investors predictions of the average opinions mentioned by Keynes. Despite the obvious importance of the above to economics there has been a very small literature on this topic. The extreme reliance of economics on``equilibrium'' (e.g., Nash equilibrium, common priors, etc.) where all agents have the same beliefs and know everything there is to know, rules out the phenomena mentioned above, a priori! There are many who believe that the``infinite regress'' problem introduced by considering such``average opinions about the average opinions of others,'' makes these models intractable. This paper contributes to a very small literature that tries to explicitly model the issues mentioned earlier, and in particular to study economies where such beliefs about beliefs may be important and to show that such models may indeed be``tractable.' ' The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, a general formal model is provided where the issues mentioned above may be studied. This draws upon the work on hierarchies of beliefs of [1] and [20] . (See [23] for more on the formal model and further references to this literature.) Second, within the context of this fairly abstract mode, conditions are provided under which over time the optimal actions of agents will converge to the Nash equilibrium of the model under the true, previously unknown,`f undamentals.'' One of the first papers to provide a convergence result in this literature is [31] who studies the model of a continuum of firms facing uncertainty about parameters of a fixed linear demand curve. Townsend proves that over time there will be convergence to Nash equilibrium of the model characterized by the true parameter values. [11] studies further the same model and obtains the convergence result under much weaker assumptions. In comparison to the work of this paper, the above very important papers should be considered as examples. In particular, both papers exploit critically the structure of the linear model of firm behavior to setup the model and obtain all results. This paper begins with an abstract model of an economy where all agents have imperfect information about fundamentals in the economy and the beliefs and actions of the other agents. Two notions of a type are defined: A Savage Bayesian type of an agent specifies that agent's utility parameters as well as that agent's beliefs about the actions and beliefs of all the other agents in the economy. This may be thought of as the most`c omprehensive'' notion of a type since it specifies``everything'' required for decision-making. A second notion of a type is a Harsanyi type. This is a notion of a type that only specifies an agent's utility parameter and that agent's beliefs about the utility parameters of other agents. This is a sparser notion of a type since, among other things, it does not specify what that agent believes about the actions of others. (This is the notion of a type typically used in Game Theory, and in particular in [14] , when talking about a Harsanyi Bayesian equilibrium; hence its name. See [24] for more on the various definitions of a``type.'' The name``Savage Bayesian'' is of course in reference to the axioms of [30] , and the Bayesian updating these axioms imply.)
A contraction property on the best-response functions is identified. This property is easily checked from the``fundamentals'' of the model. For example, in the model of firms studied in the papers of Townsend and Feldman, this contraction property holds whenever the slope of the demand curve is less than one in absolute value. Under this contraction property each agent's optimal action may be stated in terms of her`s parser'' Harsanyi type. With this, a martingale argument may be used to conclude that the optimal actions of agents must converge to the Nash equilibrium of the model characterized by the true underlying previously unknown``fundamentals. '' This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, an``example'' is presented, which is essentially the model studied by Townsend and Feldman. I sketch how the convergence result is obtained in the example in three``STEPS.'' In the main part of the paper I show how these STEPS are generalized in the abstract model which may be non-linear and multivariate (i.e., may have a vector choice variable.) In the Section 9 I indicate what could go wrong when the key assumptions are violated. I show that a violation of the contraction property may result in an``anything is possible'' result where any stochastic process of actions consistent with maximizing behavior, common knowledge of it, and Bayesian updating. I show by an example that a violation of the mutual absolute continuity condition may result in cyclical behavior of actions on each sample path.
As regards the previous literature I have already mentioned the papers [31] and [11] . [7] and [27] also study the``example'' of the model of firms. [5] and [17] also obtain results on the convergence of beliefs under different assumptions. These two papers do not model the hierarchies of beliefs of agents. Further, their results typically require that the space of types be finite or countable and will in general fail if the set of different possible types or beliefs of agents may be indexed by say the unit interval. (In particular, if the type space is in``canonical form'' where each agent chooses a different play and each such play is pure (i.e., does not involve randomization), then the Kalai and Lehrer assumptions require the type space to be finite or countable. See [21] for details.).
The assumptions of this paper are more related to those of [15] , [16] and [22] . However those papers exploit the special structure of repeated finite action games and would not work for the models studied in this paper. The work of this paper complements the recent work on non-Bayesiaǹ`l earning,'' and in particular the literature on ordinary least-squares learning of [8] , [12] and [19] . This paper is the``Bayesian Learning'' equivalent of that literature. This paper is the multi-agent extension of the work on single-agent Bayesian learning models of began by [6] and others. This paper owes that literature an intellectual debt.
A MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Suppose that there is a set of agents indexed by the unit interval I=[0, 1] and uniformly distributed along that interval. For technical reasons suppose also that there are finitely many classes of agents within that interval with all agents of the same class identical in all respects. Fix any date n. At that date agent i must choose an output level y in . The aggregate output is then y n # 1 0 y in di. The price of that output is determined via a linear demand curve p n =:&;y n += n , where : and ; are fixed parameters,``the fundamentals,'' and = n is the date n shock to the demand curve a zero mean unobserved random variable. Suppose that there is imperfect information over the parameter :. The value of the parameter ; is common knowledge. The cost to firm i of choosing the output y in is c( y in )=0.5y 2 in . The profit of firm i is then p n y in &0.5y 2 in . Let E in denote the date ǹ`e xpectations operator'' of agent i. The profit maximizing output of firm i is then y in =E in p n =E in :&;E in y n . Notice that to choose an optimal action agent i must form a belief over both the fundamentals, :, and the (aggregate) actions of other agents, y n . Hence, maximizing behavior of firms (written as (MB)) implies the following:
(The optimal output level should really be y in =Max[0, E in :&;E in Y n ] to ensure non-negative outputs of each agent. In this example this is ignored.
In the formal part of the paper, it will be shown that non-negative outputs can easily be handled using the techniques developed here.) Given any``random variable'' x let G n x denote the``average opinion'' of x, i.e., the average of the date n expectations of agents over x, G n x= 1 0 (E in x) di. Integrating (2.1) over i implies that y n =G n :&;G n y n .
(2.1$)
When :=0 and ;=&1 in (2.1), y in =E in y n so we have the [18] beauty contest problem where each agent seeks to forecast the average action of all the agents. Note that the Nash equilibrium for this model is the action y in =:Â(1+;) for all i.
At the end of each period n agents observe the price level p n and update their hierarchies of beliefs over %. At date n+1 they again choose actions via (2.1) but with their revised hierarchies of beliefs. Suppose that the above decision-problem occurs at each date n=1, 2, ... . Take the error process [= n ] n=1 to be independent and identically distributed with zero mean and bounded first moment.
We shall suppose that the agents do not observe the aggregate output at the end of the period. Hence, the learning problem facing agents is not a standard statistical inference problem of determining the coefficients of a linear regression equation from observations of both the regressors and the dependent variable observable.
We shall show that for this model when | ;| <1, then along each sample path the optimal actions of each agent, y in , will converge to the Nash equilibrium output level, :Â(1+;), for the true parameter value :. This section will illustrate the main ideas only. The rest of the paper will present the formalism and show how the result in this example is generalized to nonlinear multi-dimensional models. The convergence result for this example will have three steps. The formal part of this paper will mimic these three steps.
Step I (Hierarchies of beliefs over fundamentals): Recall that for a random variable x, G n x is the``average opinion'' of x, G n x#
Since agent i will not in general know the beliefs of agents j{i, agent i will not know the value of G n x so will form an expectation, E in G n x of the unknown quantity G n x. Define G n (G n x) or G 2 n x to be the average opinion G n x; i.e., G 2 n x= 1 0 (E in G n x) di. Inductively, define G r n x to be the r-times average opinion of the average opinion . . . of x.
There is 1-level knowledge of (MB) if agents know that other agents engage in (MB); there is 2-level knowledge of (MB) if agents know that other agents know that other agents engage in (MB); etc. It is easy to see (by repeatedly substituting (2.1$) into (2.1)) that the following are the implications of such levels of knowledge of (MB):
(1-level knowledge of (MB)) y in =E in :&;E in G n :+; 2 E in G n y n ; (2.2) (2-level knowledge of (MB))
and (R-level knowledge of (MB))
In (2.4) G 0 :#:. For example under 2-levels of knowledge of (MB) the optimal action of agent i can be written in terms of that agent's expectation of :, that agent's expectation of the average opinion of :, E in G n :, and that agent's expectation of the average opinion of the average opinion of y n , E in G 2 in y n . Now suppose that (i) 0<;<1 and (ii) there are some constants :Ä and K in [0, ), such that it is common knowledge that (:, y n ) lies in
I.e., each agent assigns probability one to the event that (:, y n ) lies in [0, :Ä ]_[ &K, K]; each agent assigns probability one to other agents having beliefs of this form; each agent assigns probability one to other agents having beliefs about other agents belief of the just mentioned form; etc. Take limits as R Ä in (2.4) to obtain:
(Common knowledge of (MB))
If in addition to (2.5) above the parameter vector : is``common knowledge'' (or alternatively, there is only one possible value of the vector :) then (2.5) reduces to y in =:Â(1+;). This is the Nash equilibrium or rational expectations equilibrium for this model. In particular, under common knowledge of (MB) and :, agents will choose the Nash equilibrium output at each date n. This conclusion, for the case when : is common knowledge, is of course the usual Rationalizability argument as in [3] , [29] , and [13] . When the parameter : is not common knowledge, then the analogous rationalizability argument results in (2.5).
Step II (Convergence): Let (0, F) denote the underlying probability space. Let + i denote the ex ante belief of agent i over 0. Assume that for all i and j in I, + i is mutually absolutely continuous with respect to each + j (i.e., they assign probability zero to the same sets). Let F i 0 be the _-algebra representing any initial private information that agent i may have. Let F in , n=1, 2, ..., be the _-algebra representing the information of agent i up to date n that is, from the observations in F i 0 and from the data [ p 1 , ..., p n&1 ]. Agent i's belief at the beginning of date n will therefore be represented by the conditional probability + i ( } | F in ). The expectations operator of agent i, E in , is defined via the probability
, is a martingale sequence. The martingale convergence theorem then implies that this sequence converges with probability one. This in turn implies that G n :# 1 0 (E in :) di converges, and hence that E in (G n :) converges. Inductively all terms of the form E in (G r&1 n :) will converge. Since | ;| <1, this in turn implies that the sum in (2.5) converges as n Ä , hence we may identify on each sample path a limiting value of the actions of each agent, y i #lim n Ä y in . (The details of these arguments of course appear in the formal part of the paper.)
Step III (Identifying the limit): Fix a sample path. We may write the demand equation as pÄ n =:&;yÄ n +=Ä n , where a bar,``&'', on top of a variable means the time average (e.g., pÄ n = n m =1 p m Ân). From the strong law of large numbers we may set lim n Ä =Ä n =0. Then pÄ =:&;y . This in turn implies that
where E i is the expectations operator under the limiting information n=1 F in , and where the last equality follows from the fact that agents will know pÄ in the limit. Upon integrating (2.6) with respect to i we may conclude that y = pÄ . Combining this with the previous conclusion that pÄ =:&;y , implies that y = pÄ =:Â(1+;). So from (2.6) we conclude that in the limit each agent i chooses the action y i =:Â(1+;), the Nash equilibrium value for the true value of the parameter :.
Summary of the Paper.
The above concludes the discussion of the example. We now proceed to the formal part of the paper. In Section 4 we introduce the concept of a Savage Bayesian type. This notion of a type specifies an agent's utility parameters as well as that agent's belief hierarchy over both the attribute vectors and the actions of other agents at each date. In Section 5 we introduce a contraction property on the optimal decision rules of agents. This plays the role played by the assumption that | ;| <1 in the example of this section. We then show that under the contraction property each agent's optimal action is a function of that agent's belief hierarchy over only the attribute vector (and we refer to this belief hierarchy as a Harsanyi type). This step is equivalent to STEP I in the example. In Section 7 we present formally the martingale argument which proves that the belief hierarchies over the attribute vector, and hence the optimal actions, converge over time. This is STEP II of the example. Finally in Section 8 we identify the limiting actions as Nash equilibria to the true game (characterized by the true attribute vectors). This corresponds to STEP III in the example of this section.
In Section 9 we indicate what goes wrong when our key assumptions fail. The failure of the contraction property may lead to an``anything is possible'' any time path of actions is possible under optimizing behavior of agents. We show by example that when the mutual absolute continuity condition on beliefs fails, we may get cyclical behavior on each sample path ad infinitum. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
SOME TERMINOLOGY AND MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
I is the finite set of economic agents. Nature is agent 0, and is not a member of I. Given any collection of sets [X i ] i # I , we define X#> i # I X i and X &i #> j{i X j unless otherwise stated; given X 0 and [X i ] i # I , we shall sometimes state that X &i #X 0 _> j{i X j . Given any collection of functions
The cartesian product of metric spaces will always be endowed with the product topology. Let X be any metric space. P(X ) denotes the set of probability measures on X (with X endowed with its Borel _-algebra, generated by the open sets of X ). The set P(X) will be endowed with the weak topology of measures; (see [4] for more on this). For ease of exposition, wherever the intent is obvious we shall assume, without mentioning this, that generic sets and functions are Borel-measurable and generic conditional probabilities are fixed regular versions.
4. THE FORMAL MODEL AT SOME FIXED DATE N
Actions and Attribute Vectors
There is a continuum of agents indexed by the unit interval I=[0, 1], and uniformly distributed on that interval. For technical reasons we shall suppose that these agents may be divided into finitely many classes with each agent in a given class identical in all respects. Each agent i is characterized by an attribute vector % i in some space 3 i , which specifies those parts of agent i 's utility function that may be unknown to other agents in the economy. Nature has an attribute vector % 0 in some space 3 0 , which determines the underlying exogenous randomness of the economy. 3 0 and 3 i are assumed to be compact metric spaces. Fix any date n. Agent i must choose at date n an action a in in an action space A i , assumed to be a compact subset of R K for some K< . The utility function of agent i is the continuous and uniformly bounded function u i : 3 i _3 0 _A i _A &i Ä R, which yields agent i's utility as a function of her own attribute vector % i # 3 i , nature's attribute vector % 0 # 3 0 , her own action, a i # A i and the actions of the other agents a &i # A &i . Note that the parameters % i and % 0 are both assumed to be independent of the date.
Beliefs and Savage Bayesian Types
At the beginning of date n agent i will be characterized by a Savage Bayesian type q in #(% i , q in ). Here % i is agent i 's attribute vector; and
is agent i 's hierarchy of beliefs over the space of attribute vectors and date n action of the agents, 3_A. In particular, q 1 in is agent i 's first order belief and is a probability which specifies agent i's beliefs over 3 &i _A &i ; q 2 in is agent i's second order belief which specifies agent i 's belief about the first order beliefs of other agents; more generally, q r+1 in is agent i's (r+1) th order belief, which specifies agent i 's belief about the r th order beliefs of other agents. Formally, q in is an element of a space Q in which is as constructed in Appendix A by setting 5 i =3 i _A i and 5 0 #3 0 in that construction. Q in #3 i _Q in is the space of agent i 's date n Savage Bayesian types. From Appendix A we know that each hierarchy of beliefs q in # Q in of agent i induces a unique probability P i (q in ) over the space 3 0 _Q &in representing agent i 's belief about nature's attribute and the Savage Bayesian types of other agents.
One may ask: In specifying an agent's beliefs why do we need to go beyond the first level belief, q 1 in over 3 &1 _A &i ? After all, is this not all that we require for determining agent i's optimal action? Well, to make statements about``common knowledge of maximizing behavior'' we need higher order beliefs. As indicated in the example of Section 2, such common knowledge assumptions will be critical in obtaining our convergence result.
Decision Rules
An agent i with Savage Bayesian type q in =(% i , q in ) that chooses an action a i will receive a date n expected utility equal to
where the integration is over % 0 # 3 0 and a &i # A &i with respect to the measure P i (q in ). Of course, for any q in =(q 1 in , q 2 in , . . .), integration over 3 0 _A &i with respect to P i (q in ) is the same as integration with respect to the first order belief q 1 in .) A date n decision rule for agent i is a (Borel-measurable) function f in : Q in Ä A i which specifies a rule for how agent i chooses a date n action as a function that her date n Savage Bayesian type, q in . Define F in to be the set of all such date n decision rules for agent i. That is,
Define F &in #> j{i F j , the set of tuples of decision rules for all agents other than i, and define F n #> j # I F j , the set of tuples of decision rules for all agents. We define the set of actions which maximize the expected utility of the agent i with Savage Bayesian type q in =(% i , q in ) to be
To ensure that f * in is well-defined we impose the following assumption:
there is a unique solution to the maximization problem in (4.3) so that f * in is unique-valued; further, the mapping f
Under the assumption of compactness of A i and continuity of u i on A i , a solution to the maximization problem in (4.3) exists. If we suppose in addition that u i is strictly concave in a i , then f * in will be unique-valued and (from Berge's maximum theorem) will be continuous, and hence Borelmeasurable, on Q in . Assumption (4.4) then holds. Suppose that agent i believes that agents j{i are choosing actions via some decision rules specified by f &in =[ f jn ] j{i # F &in . If agent i is of Savage Bayesian type q in =(% i , q in ), then her best-response may be denoted by (4.5) where the integration is over % 0 and q &in with respect to the measure P i (q in ) induced by agent i's Savage Bayesian type. Equation (4.5) of course defines a mapping 9 in : F &in Ä F in with the interpretation that if at date n agent i of Savage Bayesian type q in believes that other agents are using decision rules f &in # F &in then the action a in =9 in ( f &in )(q in ) is optimal in the sense implicit in (4.5). Define 9 n : F n Ä F n by setting
is the profile of best-response decision rules, one for each agent, that the agents use when they believe that others are using the decision rules specified by
Notice that the definition of 9 in above involves a counter-factual of some sort. Agent i of Savage Bayesian type q in has a belief about the actions of other agents given by the measure P i (q in ). In computing 9 in ( f &in ) however we perform the thought-experiment``if agent i believes others are using decision rules f &in , what is agent i's optimal action.'' In reality of course agent i need not believe that others are using those particular decision rules.
In reality, each agent i believes agent j chooses actions via her optimal decision rule, f * jn . We may assume that each agent i knows f * jn for the following reason: By assumption the parameter % j represents that part of agent j 's utility function that other agents may have imperfect information about; hence agent i knows j's utility function as a function of % j . Further, agent j 's belief is uniquely specified by q in . Hence, each agent i can determine the optimal action of any agent j as a function of that agent j 's Savage Bayesian type q jn =(% j , q jn ). We suppose agents do indeed choose optimal actions given their belief and this fact is common knowledge. This implies that each agent will know how other agents are choosing their actions as a function of their Savage Bayesian types. In particular each agent i will know that agent j chooses her action via the decision rule f * jn of (4.3). Since each agent i knows that the other agents are using decision rules f * &in #[ f * jn ] j{i , and since each such agent i is maximizing expected utility, f * in must be a best-response to f * &in , so f * in =9 in ( f * &in ). This in turn implies that f n * #[ f * in ] is a fixed point of the mapping 9 n .
STEP I: DECISION RULES AS FUNCTIONS OF BELIEF HIERARCHIES OVER FUNDAMENTALS
5.1. We endow the space of agent i 's decision rules, F in , with the sup norm, & } &, which is defined for any
and where | } | is the Euclidean norm over A i R K . The sup norms on the product spaces F &in and F n are defined to be the``maximum'' of the sup norms of the coordinate spaces; i.e., given any
We will now require the best response mapping 9 in to be a contraction: (Contraction) For each i # I, 9 in : F &in Ä F in is a contraction of modulus # i where 0 # i <1. That is, for all f &in and f $ &in in (5.2)
Under (5.2) it is easy to verify that 9 n #[9 in ] i # I : F n Ä F n is also a contraction operator, of modulus #=Max i # I # i <1. Since F n is easily verified to be a complete normed space under the sup norm we conclude from the contraction mapping theorem that 9 n has a unique fixed point. We argued earlier that the collection of optimal decision rules, f n * # [ f * in ] i # I is a fixed point of 9 n . Hence under (5.2), f n * #[ f * in ] i # I is the only fixed point of 9 n .
Example (The Linear Muth Model )
We now verify that in the example of Section 2 when the intercept of the demand curve, ;, is less than one in absolute value then the contraction property (5.2) holds. In that example we set the optimal action of agent i to be y in =E in [:&;y n ] where : is the parameter vector and y n = 1 0 y jn dj is the aggregate output level. In verifying that (5.2) we will make life harder for ourselves by complicating the model in two ways. First suppose (as we should have in that example) that the optimal action of each agent is y in = Max[0, E in [:&;y n ]], so that the agent never chooses negative output and never has negative profit. Suppose also that the parameter ; may be unknown. The earlier assumption that | ;| <1 now becomes: there exists a constant ; <1 such that it is common knowledge that the absolute value of ; is less than ; <1.
The set up of Section 4 requires that the action spaces be compact. To obtain this we proceed as follows: We suppose that the parameter : is uniformly bounded and in particular that there exists an :Ä >0 such that it is common knowledge to all agents that : :Ä . By assumption agents are choosing non-negative outputs. If this fact is known to each agent then the optimal action of each agent becomes y in =E in [:&;y in ] :Ä . Hence we may take the action space of each agent to be the interval [0, :Ä ]. (The requirement that the optimal actions lie in a compact set is referred to by [13] as the``credible price boundedness'' assumption. ) We now verify that the contraction property (5.2) holds. Suppose that agent i believes that each agent j{i is using the decision rule Y j : Q jn Ä R 1 + ; i.e., agent i believes that the agent j of Savage Bayesian type q jn chooses action Y j (q jn ). Then the optimal action for agent i of Savage Bayesian type q in is the action
where 
Example (The Non-Linear Muth Model )
We now consider a non-linear version of the above Muth problem. To this effect let us suppose that the cost function is not quadratic and the demand function is not linear. The objective of the firm may be taken to be to maximize expected profit,
The first order condition for this problem will be E in p n = c( y in )Â y in . Hence in general the solution will be of the form
where L is some possibly non-linear function of the expected price. Next, suppose that the demand curve is of the form p n =W(:&;y n )+= n where W is a possibly non-linear function of the expected output :&;y n given the parameter vector % 0 =(:, ;) and the aggregate output y n # y jn dj; and where = n is a zero mean shock term. Combining these relations implies that
Let &L& and &W& be the modulus of contraction of the functions L and W, resp. Let ; be a bound on the unknown parameter ; as in Example 5.2. Assume that ; &L& } &W&<1 (and note that for this L and W need not necessarily be contraction operators of modulus less than one). Let Y i (q in ) and Y &i (q &in ) have the same interpretation as in Example 5.2. Then, following the arguments used in Example 5.2, it is easy to verify that &Y i &Y$ i & ; &L&} &W& &Y &i &Y$ &i &, so that the contraction property holds.
Harsanyi Types
Agent i of Savage Bayesian type q in will also have a date n belief hierarchy
in is agent i's first order belief over 3 and is a probability that specifies agent i's beliefs over 3 &i #3 0 _> j{i 3 j ; { Define C i (T in ) to be the set of all continuous Harsanyi-type based decision rules for agent i:
where T n #> i#I T in . In comparison, recall that F in is the set of decision rules of agent i which are (measurable) functions of agent i's Savage Bayesian type. Each g in # C i (T in ) may be identified with a unique element f in of F in by setting for each 
where the integration is over % 0 # 3 0 and { &i # T &i with respect to the measure p i ({ in ). Notice that this expected utility is a function only of agent i's Harsanyi type { in . Hence the optimal action a i may be chosen as a function of { in . Under (4.4) the optimal action of an agent from any belief is unique, so the optimal action of each agent will be chosen as a function of { in . From the assumption that the utility function is continuous we may conclude that the resulting decision rule is a continuous function of { in . (See the maximum theorem of [2] .) In particular,
This in turn implies that 9 n #[9 in ] i # I : C(T ) Ä C(T ). We argued earlier that 9 n is a contraction operator with fixed point equal to the profile of
is a closed normed space when endowed with the sup norm, the fixed point of 9 n lies in C(T n ). Hence we have:
Proposition 5.1. For each i # I, the optimal decision rule of each agent is a continuous function of that agent's Harsanyi type; i.e. f * in # C i (T in ).
Example (The Muth Model ):
Consider again the example of Section 2. There, the attribute vector is the parameter :. An agent's Harsanyi type specifies that agent's belief hierarchy over :. We showed in Eq. (2.5) that under the common knowledge of maximizing behavior (MB), each agent's action is a function of that agent's hierarchy of beliefs over :. Notice that the expression in (2.5) involves sums of expectations. Since expectations are continuous in the probabilities it is easy to verify that (2.5) is a continuous function of the hierarchy of beliefs over :. In particular, from Eq. (2.5) we see that each agent i's optimal action is an element of C i (T i ). This verifies Proposition 5.1.
THE DYNAMIC MODEL
6.1. Let 0 be the underlying space on which all random variables are defined. (Formally, 0 is the``state space'' as constructed in [23] , and is a complete and separable metric space). Any | # 0 specifies the action of each agent at each date n=1, 2, . . .; it also specifies the attribute vector %=[% 0 , [% i ] i # I ] and any other underlying randomness in the economy. F denotes the set of Borel subsets of 0. Each agent i has an ex ante subjective belief, + i , which is a probability over (0, F) and represents that agent's prior belief over 0. For each i # I, there is a non-decreasing sequence of _-algebras [F in ] n=0 of F. F i0 represents the information agent i receives at`d ate 0,'' information which specifies agent i's attribute vector % i . F in is the _-algebra representing the information of agent i at the beginning of date n (after date n&1 decisions have been made). This information would come from all observations of agent i from periods 0 through n&1. At the beginning of date n in the state of the world | # 0, agent i 's belief about the true state of the world is represented by the value at | of the probability + i conditional on F in , + i ( } | F in )(|); her Savage Bayesian type will be some q in (|)=(% in (|), q in (|)) # Q in ; her Harsanyi type will be given by { in (|)=(% in (|), { in (|)) # T in ; and she will choose the action a in (|)= f * in (q in (|)).
We shall assume that the collection of subjective ex ante beliefs of agents,
Condition (GH). + i and + j are mutually absolutely continuous \i, j # I; i.e., \i, j # I and \D 0, + i (D)>0 if and only if + j (D)>0.
Condition (GH) requires that agents agree ex ante about the events which have zero probability. Condition (GH) does not require the ex post probabilities after receipt of information on their utility attributes, + i ( } | F i0 )(|) and + j ( } | F i0 ), to be mutually absolutely continuous. It should be clear that if + i =+ for all i, so that + is a common prior, then condition (GH) holds. Condition (GH) is therefore weaker than the common prior assumption. We therefore name this``condition (GH)'' for`G eneralized Harsanyi'' common prior condition. To enable us to state our results more succinctly we fix a measure +* which is mutually absolute continuous to each of the + i . For example we could fix an agent i' and set +* equal to + i $ . One may wish to think of the measure +* as that of aǹ`o utside observer.'' Alternatively +* may be interpreted as the``true distribution'' if it is generated by the``true'' ex ante distribution of the Savage Bayesian types of agents and the``true'' behavior of the agents.
STEP II: CONVERGENCE OF BELIEF HIERARCHIES OVER FUNDAMENTALS
7.1. In Section 5 we concluded that each agent i at each date n chooses a date n action as a continuous function of her Harsanyi type. This corresponds to STEP I in the example of Section 2. A Harsanyi type is a date n belief hierarchy over the attribute vector. Note that the true value of the attribute vector does not vary over time it's value is fixed at date 0. An agent's Harsanyi type is a belief hierarchy over the attribute vector, and may vary over time because of the information received over time. However in the long run this information has smaller and smaller influence on beliefs about the fixed attribute vector. In this section we shall show that each agent i's date n belief hierarchy over the attribute vector, and in particular that agent's date n Harsanyi type, converges over time (i.e., as n Ä ). Note that this is STEP II of the example of Section 2.
We shall use condition (GH) in obtaining the convergence result. The convergence will hold on a set of sample paths with``probability one''. Under condition (GH) the``probability one'' is with respect to both + i and +*. The results of this section will not specify where beliefs converge to, and in particular the results here will not claim that there is convergence to complete information about the true parameter vector; this will be the purpose of the next section, Section 8.
For emphasis, we write { r in (|) to denote the date n rth order belief of agent i over the attribute vector in the sample path | # 0. We let { i (|) denote the hierarchy of beliefs under the limiting information field F i = n=1 F in for agent i at |. Let wlim denote the operation of taking the limit of a sequence of probability measures in the weak topology of measures. (See [4] , for more on this.) Define for each i # I and each r and n=1, ..., , The set C r i is the set of sample paths where the i th agent's r th order beliefs over % converge; the set C is the set where all orders of beliefs of each agent converge.
Theorem 7.1 (Convergence of Beliefs). Suppose condition (GH) holds. Then +*(C)=1.
Theorem 7.1 implies that along each sample path (excluding a set with zero probability) the date n Harsanyi type of each agent, { in , converges as n Ä to some value { i . From Section 5 we know that the date n action a in is a continuous function of the date n Harsanyi type { in . Theorem 7.1 therefore implies that a in converges to a limiting action a i along each sample path (excluding a set of sample paths with +*, and therefore + j for all j # I, probability zero). In particular we have: To characterize the limiting actions as Nash equilibria for the true % 0 , we will have to provide a condition which says that enough information about % 0 is obtained in the limit. It turns out that we do not need to assume that % 0 is learnt completely in the limit; a sufficient statistic is enough. Indeed, for each i # I, suppose that there exists a function H i : 3 0 _A &i Ä R m , for m< and a function U i : 3 i _A i _R m Ä R such that the utility function of agent i may be written as
In (8.2) we see that H i (% 0 , a &i ) is à`s ufficient statistic'' for % 0 and a &i when computing agent i's utility. Suppose that each agent i knows the value of h i *=H i (% 0 , a* &i ). Suppose also that each agent is maximizing utility subject to knowledge of h i * ; i.e., suppose that
Then from the definition of U i in (8.2) i # I may be a Nash equilibrium in the sense that they are optimal when each agent i behaves as if she knows the true % 0 and the true actions of others, a* &i ; however agent i may in reality choose the action a i * based on a belief about % 0 and the actions of others, a* &i , which is different from, or involves uncertainty about, the true value of % 0 and the actions of others.
We know from Section 7 that under our assumptions the actions of agents converge so that a in Ä a i for all i # I. If each agent i's utility function has the representation in (8.2) and H i is continuous then we may conclude that h in #H i (% 0 , a &in ) converges to h i #H i (% 0 , a &i ). We will assume that agent i learns in the limit the value of h i #H i (% 0 , a &i ). The earlier argument then implies that the limiting actions constitute a Nash equilibrium.
The requirement that agent i learns h i in the limit is equivalent to the requirement that h i be measurable with respect to the agent's limit information, F i # n=0 F in . We now provide some justification for such an assumption: Note that h in is the item that appears in the agent i's utility function, perhaps after integrating out noise terms. At the end of each period after the utility has been``enjoyed,'' the agent should be able to invert the utility function and recover a perhaps noisy estimate of h in . Since h in #H i (% 0 , a &in ) and a &in converges, it is reasonable to expect that in the limit the agent will learn the limiting value of h in -usually by averaging out the noise term via a law of large numbers type argument. We show in Section 8.2 that this is the case in the Muth examples. For more general techniques of handling this learning problem, and in particular on determining when h is F i measurable, see [26] .
The proposition below, our main theorem, summarizes this discussion. (% 0 , a &i ) ). Then for +*-a.e. sample path, the collection of limiting actions, [a i ] i # I is a Nash (or Rational Expectation) Equilibrium for the true parameter vector %=(% 0 , [% i ] i # I ) defined for that sample path.
Example
Consider the Muth model of Section 2. In that example nature's attribute vector is the parameter % 0 =:. We may define
which is equal to the expected price when the actions of all agents except i (who is``small'') is y &i =[ y j ] j{i and the intercept of the demand curve is :. The profit function of agent i when she chooses output y i may then be written as We will show in Theorem 9.1 below that under condition (R) we have aǹ`a nything is possible'' result: Any stochastic process of actions (in > n=1 > i # I A i ) is a possible outcome consistent with common knowledge of maximizing behavior (MB)). The intuition behind Theorem 9.1 is as follows: The only restrictions between date n and date n+1 beliefs is due to the fact that the true parameter vector, %, is fixed between those two periods. This means that we can not vary agents belief hierarchies over % across time at will. Instead, beliefs will obey a Bayesian updating condition and will converge, from Theorem 7.1. Under the contraction property the belief hierarchy over % determines completely the optimal actions of agents (Proposition 5.1) from which we obtain the convergence of actions. Without the contraction property, and in particular with condition (R), there is no such link between belief hierarchies over % and optimal actions. To state our anything is possible result we need a bit more structure. Consider as fixed 3, and [A i , u i ] i # I . For the dynamic problem we need to specify in addition the process governing the observations of agents (which in the case of the Muth example is the price process). To this effect, fix some sets [Z i ] i # I with the interpretation that z in # Z i is agent i 's end of date n observation. Agent i's end of date n history of observations will therefore be [% i , a i1 , z i1 , ..., a in , z in ], which includes her attribute vector % i and past history of own actions. We take as given, or as a primitive of the model, the conditional probabilities P(z n | a n , z n&1 , ..., z 1 , a 1 , %) which show how the date n observations are generated as a function of the past actions and observations and the initial date 1 attribute vectors. Definê AZ to be the set of all probability distributions over the stochastic process (%, a 1 , z 1 , a 2 , z 2 , . . .) such that for all n the conditional probability of z n given (a n , z n&1 , ..., z 1 , a 1 , %) is P(z n | a n , z n&1 , ..., z 1 , a 1 , %). We then have: Observe that this theorem places no conditions on the true value of the parameter % 0 . For example in the linear Muth model it suffices that agents believe that the true value of ; is larger than one for the theorem to hold, even though the true value of ; may be strictly less than one.
Example Where Agents have Misspecified Priors (i.e., (GH) Fails) and
Outputs Cycle on Every Sample Path.
Consider the linear Muth example parametrized as follows: ;=1Â3 and this fact is common knowledge; and each agent i believes that all other agents j believe that it is common knowledge that :=4Â3. Then (2.5) implies that agent i believes that all other agents j will choose action y j =:Â(1+;)=1 in each period. Each agent i believes that the parameter : can be one of two points, :$=4Â3 or :"=1. Let & 1 be the probability assigned to the event [:=:$] and suppose that 0<& 1 <1. Notice that each agent assigns probability zero to the true belief hierarchies of other agents; each agent i is sure the other agents j will choose actions y j =1 at all dates while in fact each agent will choose actions which depend upon beliefs of : over [:$, :"]. Indeed, if & n is agent i 's date n probability assigned to the event [:=:$] then from (2.1) agent i 's optimal date n action is
Hence condition (GH) is violated. Suppose that the true value of : is :*=10Â9. Suppose also that the noise process [= n ] n=1 is normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance. Since = has support on all of the real line observe that despite the fact that the i th agent's beliefs assign probability zero to the true beliefs of others, the agent is not confronted with data (a price level) at any finite date that can not be explained with some value of the noise term = at that date. Hence at each date the agent may update her beliefs using Bayes' rule in the usual manner.
For this model the Nash equilibrium output is 5Â6. In the proposition below we show that optimal outputs, y n , cycle ad infinitum between outputs of 1 and 2Â3, and hence around the Nash equilibrium output. Also, beliefs & n cycle between 0 and 1. Proposition 9.2. Let +* denote the true probability (over 0) generated by the true value of :=:*. Then for +*-a.e. sample path, lim sup n Ä y n =1, lim inf n Ä y n =2Â3, lim sup n Ä & n =1 and lim inf n Ä & n =0.
The intuition behind the result is the following: Suppose that over time agent i assigns large probability to the intercept term being equal to :$. Then from (9.1) the agent will choose actions approximately equal to 1. The data observed by the agent is then approximately p*=:*&;=10Â9& 1Â3=7Â9, ignoring the shock terms. Since 7Â9 is closer to :"&;=1&1Â3= 2Â3 than to :$&;=4Â3&1Â3=1, the agent will assign more weight to :" being the true value of : than to :$. As the agent becomes more confident that :" is the true value of :, from (9.1) the agent will choose actions approximately equal to 2Â3. Ignoring the shocks, the data observed by the agent is then approximately p n *=:&(2Â3) ;=10Â9&2Â9=8Â9. The agent believes y=1 so believes that the data generating process is p n =:&;. Since 8Â9 is closer to :$&;=4Â3&1Â3=1 than to :"&;=1&1Â3=2Â3, the agent will assign more weight to :$ being the true value of :. This process then repeats itselfs, and hence we see how optimal actions may cycle between the values y=1 and y=2Â3 ad infinitum.
The Continuum of Agents and Zero Discount Factor Assumptions
With our continuum assumption on the set of agents, there is no active learning (or``teaching''). In particular, agents can not individually change their actions to either get better information or to signal information to other agents. The zero discount factor assumption implies that the agents would not even want to do such active learning, even if they could, since all payoffs would acrue in the future and that is not taken into account in current decisions. If one were to introduce positive discount factors and drop the continuum assumption, once could still make some progress using the techniques of [17] , [16] and [21] . Several differences have to be noted though. First, the papers just mentioned in general do not obtain convergence to Nash, but rather to subjective equilibrium of the repeated game. Note well that from the folk theorem there are many Nash equilibria to the repeated game and hence even more subjective equilibria. Second, the above mentioned papers typically require finitely many actions and require agents to observe the same past history of actions private information is not allowed in those papers. Finally, note that when agents observe the price signal, their``types'' become correlated, even if initially they were independent. One would then have to appeal to the results of [22] (which is only for zero discount factors) rather than the above mentioned papers to make progress on the positive discount factor case, and even in that case one may have to settle with correlated equilibria, suitably defined for the positive discount factor model.
APPENDIX A: HIERARCHIES OF BELIEFS AND THE SPACE B i
10.1. In this appendix we sketch the construction of hierarchies of beliefs. The reader should consult [23] for the details and for references to the literature. Recall that I is the set of ( finitely many classes of) agents and nature is referred to as agent 0 (not a member of I). We take as given a collection of complete and separable metric spaces 5 0 and [5 i ] i # I . We shall consider 5 i to be the set pertaining to agent i; this will have the meaning that i``knows'' her own value of ! i # 5 i . We consider 5 0 to be the parameters of``nature.'' We proceed to construct the space of hierarchies of beliefs over the space 5=5 0 _> i # I 5 i . Recall that given any metric space X, P(X ) denotes the set of probability measures on the Borel subsets of X. Recall also that P(X ) is endowed with the weak topology of measures. If X is a complete and separable metric space then so is P(X). The set of all possible belief hierarchies of agent i is then defined to be the set We will now construct aǹ`a ssociated'' probability P i (b i ) # P(B &i _5 &i ) with the property that for each integer r, the marginal of P i (b i ) on B [23] .) Since cylinder sets are``convergence determining'' it is easy to check that the mapping P i : B i Ä P(B &i _5 &i ) is continuous.
The Mapping h i : Q i Ä T i
Fix any date n. For expositional convenience we drop the subscript n from Q in and T in . We now define inductively the mapping h i : Q i Ä T i which determines the Harsanyi type { i =h i (q i ) of an agent with Savage Bayesian type q i . Define h 
(It is easy to verify that h i (q i ) thus defined lies in T i ).
APPENDIX B: THE PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 7.1. We begin with the following result, which is a direct implication of the Martingale Convergence theorem (see [10, Theorem 9.4.8 
., (p. 340]):
Claim. Let X n for n=1, 2, . . . and n= be a sequence of uniformly bounded real-valued random variables on 0. Fix any i # I and suppose that lim n Ä X n =X + i -a.e. Then lim Finally, for any Proof of Proposition 9.1 (Cont'd). Define 0 0 #3_> n=1 A n _Z n , 0 1 #> n=1 T n _Q n and 0#0 0 _0 1 . We will first define for each | 0 # 0 0 an element | 1 (| 0 ) # 0 1 . We will then define + i to be the measure over 0 obtained by first choosing | 0 via P AZ then choosing | 1 via | 1 (| 0 ). Clearly the marginal of + i on 0 0 is P AZ as required by the proposition. It only remains to show that we can construct | 1 (| 0 ) # 0 1``c onsistently.'' So fix an | 0 =(%, a 1 , z 1 , a 2 , z 2 , ...) # 0 0 . Given %=[% i ] i # I , pick for each i # I any { i1 # T i which has an associated attribute vector % i . Given ({ i1 , a i1 ) and referring to Lemma 9.1.1 define q i1 =F 1 ({ i1 , a i1 ). We proceed by induction. Suppose for some N we have defined ({ in , q in ) for n=1, ..., N, with the property that q in =F i ({ in , a in ) for n=1, ..., N. We will assume that the probability law of the observation process is common knowledge. Omitting the details (see [23] ) this means we can talk about agent i 's belief hierarchy over 3 &i _A &i conditional on the observation of z iN , q iN ( } | z iN ) # Q i . Define { iN+1 #h i (q iN ( } | z N ) ) to be the induced belief hierarchy over % and use Lemma 9.1.1 again and define q iN+1 = F i ({ iN+1 , a iN+1 ). Hence by induction we obtain the sequence [q in , a in ] n=1 . In particular we have the element | 1 (| 0 ) # 0 1 alluded to earlier. It should be clear that with this definition of | 1 (| 0 ) and the earlier defined + i for i # I, + i is an ex ante subjective belief of agent i over 0 and that we obtain the conclusion of Proposition 9. =L n +5Â54& y n+1 Â9+= n+1 Â3. , y N+1 ) to be _-field generated by the specified variables for any N 1. Then (9.2.2) implies that Prob(L N+1 K | F* N )= Prob(= N+1 d N | F* N ), which, since = N+1 is independent of F* N , is equal to Prob (= N+1 d N ) . From the``conditional'' Borel-Cantelli lemma (see [9, p. 26] ) we may conclude that on each sample path, (a) From (9.1) and the fact that agents are identical, to prove (a) it clearly suffices to prove that y n does not converge. Fix any sample path and suppose, per absurdem, that on that path the aggregate output y n converges to some value y . Define, along that sample path, pÄ # lim N Ä (1ÂN) 
